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CASENOTES
questionable, even in light of this decision, whether Florida would apply
the felony-murder doctrine where the deceased is a co-felon. Prior to the
instant case, the only cases holding the doctrine applicable to the death
of a co-felon, were those in which a co-felon either accidently caused his
own death 17 or was unintentionally killed by another felon.",
The principal case presents a far-reaching application of the felony
murder doctrine, for it is, as far as can be ascertained, the first time the
doctrine has been applied where the victim of a felony justifiably kills a
co-felon. The majority based its decision on the concept that the death
of the co-felon was the natural consequence of the felonious act. But, how
can one be guilty of murder for a killing that was unquestionably a justi-
fiable homicide? Here, the deceased was a perpetrator of the robbery whose
death was certainly not in furtherance of the crime. The conviction of his
co-felon seems to be a wholly unwarranted extension of the doctrine. It
is submitted, therefore, that the felony murder doctrine should not be one
of limitless application. \Vhere the homicide is justifiable, it should not




The defendant's sentence was set aside, and a greater sentence im-
posed under the habitual offender law,' predicated upon a prior felony
conviction for which a full pardon had been given. Held, reversed, the
prior conviction may not be considered under the habitual offender law
when a full pardon has been granted. Fields v. State, 85 So. 2d 609 (Fla.
1956).
There is conflict of authority as to the effect of a pardon.2 The minority
view takes the position that a pardon has the effect of blotting out both
the legal consequences and the gilt of the offender. This rationale has
its basis in Blackstone's definition that ". . . the effect of such pardon by
the king is to make the offender a new man. .. " 4Ex parte Garland-- is an
illustrative case. There the court held a pardon reached both the punish-
17. Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955).
18. People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App.2d 52, 87 P.2d 364 (1939).
1. FLA. STAT. § 775.09 (1953).
2. See Weihofen, The Effect of a Pardon, 88 U. PA. L. Riv. 177 (1939);
Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt?, 28 ItARV. L. REv. 647 (1915).
3. State v. Childers, 197 La. 715, 2 So.2d. 189 (1941); State v. Martin, 59
Ohio St. 212, 52 N.E. 188 (1898); Ex Parte Crump, 10 Okla. Crim. 133, 135 Pac 428
(1913); Scrivnor v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 194. 20 S.W.2d 416 (1925), rev'd, Jones v.
State, 141 Tex. Crim. 70, 147 S.W.2d 508 (1941); Edwards v. Commonwealth,
78 Va. 39, 49 Am. Rep. 377 (1883).
4, 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 1773.
5. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
inient and the guilt of the offender, and in the eyes of the law the offender
never committed the offense. Jurisdictions following this theory hold that
a pardoned conviction cannot be used as a basis for invoking habitual
offender laws. It is argued that to hold otherwise would be a punishment
in consequence of the pardoned prior offense and not of the subsequent
offense? Further, to ])ermit the pardoned offense to be counted as a con-
viction under the habitual offender laws would constitute a legislative
limitation upon the executive power to pardon.8
The majority of jurisdictions hold that a prior pardon is immaterial"
since the habitual offender laws create aii offense that is separate and dis-
tinct.10 Increased punishment is for the latter offense only, and the prior
conviction is but an element in determining its application.1  In People v.
Carlesi,1- it was held that a pardon restores civil rights and terminates
legal consequences flowing from the conviction, but the record of guilt
cannot be obliterated. Evcn a presidential pardon with a recital of the
belief that the offender was innocent will not eradicate the judicial finding
of guilt. -1 Although pardoned, one is still a convicted criminal" because
the executive has no power to direct the judiciary to forget the fact of the
prior conviction;' it is a record of the court that cannot be erased or blotted
out.'" There is no legislative interference with the executive's power to
pardon, as it is within the province of the legislature to attach greater
criminality to a subsequent offense of which the pardoned prior offense
is but an element.17
Prior to the instant ease the Florida Supreme Court had not been
confronted with the precise issue presentecd therein. However, the court
6. See note 3 supra.
7. Edwards v. Coimnonwealth, 78 Va. 39, 49 Am. Rep. 377 (1883).
8. State v. Lee, 171 La 744, 132 So. 219 (1931).
9. Groseclose v, Plummet, 106 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 614 (1939); People ex rel. Prisament v. Brophy, 287 N.Y. 132, 38 N.E.2d 468
(1941), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 625 (1942); Jones v. State, 141 Tcx. Crim. 70, 147
S.W.2d 508 (1941); State v. Edelstein, 146 Wash. 221, 262 Pac. 622 (1927); Dean v.
Skeen, 70 S.E.2d 256 (W, Va. 1952).
10. People v. Carlesi, 154 App, Div. 481, 139 N.Y. Supp. 309, aff'd on op below,
208 N.Y. 547, 101 N.E. 1114 (1913), aff'd, 233 U.S. 51 (1914); State v. Bloomdale,
21 N.D. 77, 128 N.W\'. 682 (1910); Commonwealth ex rel. v. Smith, 324 Pa. 73,
187 At]. 387 (1936).
11. McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); People v. Dotton, 9
Cal.2d 505, 71 P.2d 218, app. disin., 302 U.S. 656 (1937); Kelley v. State, 204
hnd. 612, 185 N.E. 453 (1933); lerndon v. Commonwealth, 105 Ky. 197, 48 S.\,
989 (1899); State v. Stern, 210 Minn. 107, 297 N.W. 321 (1941).
12. 154 App. Div. 481, 139 N.Y. Supp. 309, aff'd on op below, 208 N.Y. 547,
101 N.E. 1114 (1913), aff'd, 233 U.S. 51 (1914).
13. People ex rel. Prisament v. Brophy, 287 N.Y. 132, 38 N.E. 2d 468 (1941),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 625 (1942).
14. People v. Biggs, 9 Cal.Zd 508, 71 P.2d 214 (1937).
15. Jones v. State, 141 Tex. Grim. 70, 147 S.V.2d 508 (1941).
16. Newton v. State, 56 Okla. Crim. 391, 40 P.2d 688 (1935); Commonwealth
ex rel. v. Smith, 324 Pa. 73. 187 At]. 387 (1936).
17. State v. Stem, 210 Minn. 107, 297 NA. 321 (1941).
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in a prior advisory opinion ruled that a pardon blotted out the offense in
the eyes of the law.18 The court has not literally interpreted this "blotting
out" theory since it later held that a pardon does not restore one to the
practice of law;' nor will it preclude revocation of a license to practice
medicine.2a They consider proceedings for a criminal act and for disbarment
as separate and distinct, and a pardon for the former is not a pardon for
the latter.2 1 These decisions, however, concerned license privileges and did
not construe the habitual offender law.
In tile principal case the court bases its decision upon an exclusionary
rule of statutory construction. It was concluded that it was the legislative
intent to exclude pardoned offenses by not expressly including them in the
habitual offender law"22 A cardinal rule of statutory construction provides
that a statute is to be construed according to the intent of the legislature.
23
All other rules of statutory consrucion are subordinate and are mere aids in
determining legislative intent.2 4 It is submitted it may have been the intent
of the legislature to include pardoned offenses in the application of this
law. However, these statutes should have no bearing when a pardon is
given because of innocence, since the elcment of criminal habit is not
present. The habitual offender laws are designed (o deter crime and thereby
to protect society. These statutes are not directed to any particular crime
but only to the recurrent offender.
The criminal character or habits of the individual, the chief postu-
late of the habitual criminal statutes, is often as clearly disclosed
by a pardoned conviction as by one never condoned. '''
IvA W. KAY, JR.
NEGLIGENCE-GUEST STATUTE-
RIGHT OF RECOVERY
The plaintiff sued for the wrongful death of her minor child who was
killed while riding as a guest in the defendant's automobile. Held, the guest
statute' applied, thus precluding the plaintiff from recovering where the
18. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor of Florida, 14 Fa. 318 (1872).
19. State v. Snyder, 136 Fla. 875, 187 So. 381 (1939).
20. Page v. Watsom, 140 Fla. 536, 192 So. 205 (1938); State v. lazzard, 139
Wash. 487, 247 Pac. 957 (1926); accord, Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E.2d
393 (1941).
21. Branch v. State, 120 Fla. 666, 163 So. 48 (1935).
22. Kelley v. State, 204 Ind. 612, 185 N.E. 453 (1933); State v. Martin, 59
Ohio St. 212, 52 N.E. 188 (1898); contra, People v. Biggs, 9 Cal.2d 508, 71 P.2d
214 (1937).
23. State v. Taylor, 80 So.2d 618 (Ala. 1954); Abood v. City of Jacksonville,
80 So.2d 443 ([-a. 1955); Crawford v. School Dist. 6, 342 Mich. 564, 70 N.W.2d
789 (1955).
24. United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540 (1938); Johnson v. Southern Pac.,
196 U.S. 1 (1904); State v. Doran, 124 Conn. 160, 198 AtI. 573 (1938).
25. People v. Biggs, 9 Cal.2d 508, 71 P.2d 214, 216 (1937).
1. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1955).
